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Breton, Bataille and Lacan’s Notion of 
“Transgressive” Sublimation 
 
KLEM JAMES 
University of Manchester 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Associating the phenomena of transgressive love and sublimation or 
considering the former an expression of the latter is not immediately 
obvious. In the seventh seminar of The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 
however, Lacan posits an alternative to the Freudian view of 
sublimation as a desexualising cathexis into creative or scientific 
works1 of “a higher social or ethical valuation” (Freud, 2001 [1922-23], 
p.256). He characterises it not as a re-direction of the libido to a non-
sexual object à la Freud,2  but as a change in the position of the love 
object within the structure of the subject’s fantasy life. For Lacan, this 
object (either a person or a thing) has the capacity to be raised up 
and transfigured metaphorically within the mind; furthermore, the 
subject’s propensity to exalt the other in this way necessarily 
increases to a backdrop of prohibition. Sublimation therefore has the 
potential to defy those boundaries established by Christian 
conservative ethics.  
 
Although such irreverent ideas might suggest more of an obvious 
kinship with the transgressive philosopher, Georges Bataille,3 
                                                 
1 In “Civilisation and Its Discontents” Freud defined sublimation as that which 
“makes it possible for higher psychical activities, scientific, artistic or 
ideological, to play such an important part in civilized life” (2001 [1930], 
p.97). 
2 “The most important vicissitude which an instinct can undergo seems to be 
sublimation; here both object and aim are changed, so that what was 
originally a sexual instinct finds satisfaction in some achievement which is no 
longer sexual” (Freud, 2001 [1922-23], p.256). 
3 Bataille who started his career as a peripheral figure within Surrealism, 
distanced himself from the movement in the late 1920s to create his own 
journal, Documents. He was subsequently followed by a number of 
important figures from within Surrealism (Denos, Leiris, Masson) who had 
originally rallied around André Breton, though deserted him for both personal 
and ideological reasons. Later on in his career, Bataille did however state 
that he had always considered himself to be the “old enemy from within” 
Surrealism (Bataille, 1994 [1946], p.49).  
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generally considered the arch-nemesis of surrealist leader, André 
Breton, I now intend to show that, when applied to the writings of both 
men, the Lacanian model of sublimation reveals a common 
understanding of desire as predicated upon transgression. I hope 
therefore to cast a new light upon a relationship which has generally 
been characterised as antagonistic, with Breton being equated with a 
sublimatory, idealising modernism and Bataille as the antithetical 
desublimatory voice which took him to task for evading material 
concerns. Moreover, the case for using Lacanian theory to offer a 
new understanding of Surrealism seems particularly strong when we 
consider that Lacan himself collaborated with the surrealists on the 
journal Minotaur in the 1930s, in which time he became greatly 
influenced by their writings on psychoanalysis and paranoia; and that 
he later set about expounding his own theory of sublimation with 
reference to their works. 
 
One of the key terms with which Lacan defined sublimation was 
“creation ex nihilo” (1992 [1959-60], p.115-27), meaning “creation 
from nothing” and which in his writings plays with the idea of creating 
meaning out of empty spaces, whether this is the conception of a 
painting on an empty canvas; the shaping of a vase on a potter’s 
wheel; the writing of poetry in the absence of love or the investment 
of meaning in a desired and/or poeticised woman (whose “empty 
space” is read by him as the vagina) (1992 [1959-60], p.162-63). 
 
For Lacan, a striking example of creation ex nihilo was to be found in 
the works of the courtly love poets of medieval France, the 
troubadours, who frequently treated the exalted female love object 
not only as an intangible romantic ideal but also as the focus of 
intimate sensual (and sexual) contact which represented a 
transgression of boundaries; for their works of courtly poetry 
thematised all forms of absences and holes. Quoting one such poet, 
Arnaud Daniel, Lacan reveals the stipulations of one particular Lady 
to her courtier, which included “putting his mouth to her trumpet” 
(1992 [1959-60], p.162) – a reference which “breaches the 
boundaries of pornography to the point of scatology” (1992 [1959-60], 
p.161) – though above all shows the vagina as reflective of a desire 
with an emptiness at its core. 
 
Within The Ethics of Psychoanalysis Lacan also identifies a number 
of surrealist poets – Breton, Péret and Éluard – who belong to the 
same lineage as the troubadours and whose works are similarly cited 
as examples of creation ex nihilo. Like Arnaud Daniel, their interest 
was in writing about love not merely as a union of souls but also as 
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an erotic union of bodies.4 The prodigious value the surrealists 
attached to the experience of what might be termed free (or elective) 
“terrestrial” love, with its emphasis on the personal and the sexual, 
and unencumbered by the constraints of marriage, certainly placed 
them at the antipodes of the religious orthodoxy of French society 
during the interwar years, for whom the enticements of such love 
were taboo.  
 
In opposition to such a view, these enticements were placed at the 
very cornerstone of the surrealist social revolution and provided one 
of the prime motives to denigrate the church for its repressive 
influence upon the collective psyche of society. In the two 
manifestoes of Surrealism, Breton exhorted readers to “kill, fly faster, 
love to your heart's content” (1969 [1953], p.13) vituperated against 
“family, country, religion” (1969 [1953], p.128), promised to restore 
meaning the notion of love in defiance of its detractors (1969 [1953], 
p.181) and came to the defence of the surrealist infatuation with 
Sade, the hero who sought to “make the mind get rid of its chains” 
(1969 [1953], p.186). Breton’s manifestoes were in many respects a 
rallying cry for citizens to break the boundaries established by a 
pervasive Christian conservative ethos. 
 
From a moral perspective, Breton and the surrealists might therefore 
not be so remote from George Bataille as might be presumed. Even 
so, many critics prefer to recall only the comparatively short-lived spat 
between both men in the late 1920s, when as an advocate of base 
materialism, Bataille famously arraigned Breton for being an “Icarian” 
idealist (1970 [1930], p.93-109) and thus an agent of his self-undoing. 
It is above all the October critics,5 such as Hal Foster, Rosalind 
Krauss, Denis Hollier and Yve-Alain Bois (considered by many as the 
foremost authority on modern art) who have characterised the 
polemic between these two men (and their adherents) in purely 
                                                 
4 Breton affirms for example that “it is absolutely true that carnal love is at 
one with spiritual love. Their reciprocal attraction must be strong enough to 
bring about perfect unity at once organic and psychic through their being 
absolutely complementary” (1969 [1953], p.301). His view might be 
compared with Péret’s conception of love: “the conjunction of all 
sublimations, regardless of the path that they have taken, the locus where 
the spirit, the flesh and the heart come to be merged in an imperishable 
diamond” (my translation) / “la conjonction de toutes les sublimations, 
quelque voie qu’elles aient empruntée, le lieu géométrique où viennent se 
fondre en un diamant inaltérable, l'esprit, la chair et le cœur” (1956, p.9). 
5 October is the name of a major American art journal founded in 1976 
specialising in contemporary art, theory and criticism. Its editors and 
contributors are amongst the most renowned art critics of the English-
speaking world. 
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oppositional terms, resorting to the clichés of Breton, the romantic 
sublimator, and Bataille, the advocate of “desublimation” and base 
materialist: 
 
it is at this point where sublimation confronts desublimation that 
Surrealism breaks down, and I mean this literally: such is the stake 
between official Bretonian and dissident Bataillean factions circa 1929 
[...]. 
  
(Foster, 1993, p.110) 
  
It is the binarism of this view which I hope to challenge within this 
article;  in order to accomplish this, it will be necessary to give a 
cursory overview of Lacanian theory, firstly to show the mechanics of 
how sublimation operates as “creation ex nihilo” and secondly to 
elucidate its transgressive nature. I will then consider how this theory 
is germane to the positions of both Breton and Bataille. 
 
According to Lacan, when the cherished love object is adulated and 
elevated in sublimation (as is in the case in troubadour and surrealist 
poetry), this serves, albeit temporarily, to complete the subject’s 
existence, to relocate what Lacan terms the ego’s “prehistoric Other” 
(1992 [1959-60], p.56) – commonly perceived as the subject’s ‘other 
half’ – without which the individual labours with a certain sense of 
existential vacuity. Lacan terms this unspecified sense of psychic lack 
“das Ding” (the German word for “the thing”). The exact formula for 
sublimation given by Lacan is the raising of the object “to the dignity 
of das Ding” (1992 [1959-60], p.112) implying an undue exaltation of 
and overinvestment in the Other. In other words, from identifying a 
desirable “something” in the external world, the subject mythologises 
and refashions it into the signifier of its complementary Other with the 
implications of dreamlike romance, false hopes and emotional self-
deception this entails (all forms of a vain exaltation of the Other).6  
 
For Lacan, sublimation is furthermore characterised by a circular 
quest or detour which consists of continually recuperating and 
refinding the lost love object or “das Ding”: “it is in its nature that the 
object as such is lost. It will never be found again. Something is there 
while one waits for something better, or worse, but which one wants” 
(1992 [1959-60], p.52) and again “[das Ding] is to be found at the 
most as something missed. One doesn’t find it, but only its 
pleasurable associations” (1992 [1959-60], p. 52). This principle also 
evokes Bataille’s statement in The Solar Anus that “movement is a 
figure of love, incapable of stopping at a particular being, and rapidly 
                                                 
6 This for Lacan is perhaps the ultimate expression of creation ex nihilo. 
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passing from one to another” (1985 [1931], p.7). This sense of 
perpetual movement to relocate the lost love object is quite apparent 
in a number of Breton’s literary works, in particular Nadja, 
Communicating Vessels and Mad Love, all three of which bear 
testament to its elusiveness: 
 
I was, I say, like a man who, thinking he has done everything to conjure 
the fates contrary to love, has had to yield to the evidence that the 
person most necessary for him for a long time had retreated, that the 
very object that had been for him the keystone of the material world was 
lost. 
 
(Breton, 1997 [1932], p. 68) 
 
Such a view of love, which implies that man is unable to content 
himself with one love object, automatically opens the door to 
controversy for it effectively questions the immutability of those 
boundaries posited by Christian doctrine for human relationships (in 
other words, a life-long, monogamous commitment to a romantic and 
sexual partnership as consecrated through marriage). At a time, when 
the commandment “thou shalt not commit adultery” still had great 
currency in society, Lacan and the surrealists were implying that 
(wo)man’s basic nature urges him/her to do exactly the reverse.  
 
In the seventh seminar Lacan is indeed quite explicit about this fact. 
He specifies that das Ding is predicated upon interdiction – the love 
object, raised up the level to the level of das Ding, frequently having a 
prohibitive or sinful quality attached to it and being forbidden by law. 
Citing those laws which form the very basis of the Judeo-Christian 
monotheistic religions, the Ten Commandments, he states: 
 
Is the Law the Thing? Certainly not. Yet I can only know of the Thing 
by means of the Law. In effect, I would not have had the idea to covet 
it if the Law hadn’t said: “Thou shalt not covet it”.  
 
(Lacan, 1992 [1959-1960], p. 83) 
 
This then refers to the proverbial tenet that it is the prohibition of an 
act that makes it more seductive. The terms “Das Ding” and “sin” are 
for Lacan kindred terms.7   
 
                                                 
7 “I believe that for a little while now some of you at least have begun to 
suspect that it is no longer I who has been speaking. In fact, with one small 
change, namely ‘Thing’ for ‘sin’ this is the speech of Saint Paul on the 
subject of the relations between the law and sin in the Epistle to the 
Romans, Chapter 7, paragraph 7” (Lacan, 1992 [1959-60], p.83). 
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He continues by explaining that laws such as the Ten 
Commandments underpin communication between human beings, 
regulating and offsetting desire in such a way as to increase man’s 
sense of temptation. With increased temptation comes the potential 
for increased pleasure. Lacan terms this pleasure jouissance (the 
French word for “climax” or extreme “pleasure”), which in the seventh 
seminar is characterised as the excessive excitation which results 
from a forbidden desire and which Lacan in his later work will bring 
into closer proximity with sublimation.8  
 
The interdiction of jouissance may according to Lacan even extend to 
a punishment of death. To illustrate the point, he quotes Kant’s 
categorical imperative and his example of the man who must decide 
between renouncing a highly pleasurable yet illicit relationship, on the 
one hand, and, the penalty of death for pursuing the relationship, on 
the other. Kant states that the man would in accordance with the 
categorical imperative choose to renounce the relationship (the 
implication being that, the alternative would, if applied on a mass 
scale, terminate life and annul the rule of law). For Lacan, Kant is 
missing the point – the very reason for illicit relationship was based 
on a fear of a punitive measure such as death; or as Bataille puts it: 
“eroticism opens the way to death” (1986 [1957], p.24). 
 
As Lacan’s own references show, many of the surrealists’ works on 
love exhibit the hallmarks of this transgressive sublimation – in 
particular, an overvaluation of the love object especially when 
contextualised by fear, instability or the threat of death. The apogee 
of Breton’s semi-autobiographical novel, Mad Love (which also reads 
as a treatise on love), adumbrates the consummation of his 
relationship with a lady (Jacqueline Lamba), whom he encounters 
quite arbitrarily as a stranger on the streets of Paris (though who 
subsequently becomes his second wife). The moment is allegorised 
as an ascent into the mountains and the attainment of “the sublime 
point”, the exalted vantage point of a bucolic and sublime landscape 
which represents the fulfilment of one’s every desire. Such a 
metaphoric ascent is of course reflective of an exalted love though it 
is clear that the poignancy of the moment would be nullified if 
references to their sexual communion and attendant sense of danger 
                                                 
8 The formulation of jouissance will become increasingly elaborate 
throughout Lacan’s career. In the seminar “D’un AUTRE à l’autre” (English 
title: “From One Other to the Other” though unpublished in English), Lacan 
will situate sublimation at the very centre of the experience of jouissance 
according to the formula: “Sublimation as a means of reaching jouissance” 
(my translation) / “La Sublimation pour atteindre la jouissance” (Lacan, 1968-
69, p.225-26). 
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were altogether absent. Although the sexual detail of this experience 
is to a large degree poeticised, Breton is compelled to recognise, and 
even venerate, the erotic “delirium of absolute presence” (1987 
[1937], p.76): 
 
 
Love, the only love that you are, carnal love, I adore, I have never 
ceased to adore your lethal shadow, your mortal shadow. A day will 
come when man will be able to recognise you for his only master, 
honouring you in the mysterious perversions you surround him with. 
 
      (Breton, 1987 [1937], p.76) 
 
Lacan remarks of Breton’s work that “it is once again in the place of 
the Thing that Breton had the madness of love emerge” (1992 [1959-
60], p.154). Breton’s ascent into the mountain certainly evokes das 
Ding and with it das Ding’s transgressive foundation, showing us that 
as the love object is exalted, we are ineluctably lead to the potential 
deadliness of jouissance. Physical love is for example described by 
Breton as casting a poisonous, deadly shadow and rather strikingly 
he qualifies the beginning of this passage with these words of 
caution: “Nevertheless, they are there, all the interdictions, the alarm 
bells, all ready to be set off, the snowy bells of the datura in case we 
might decide to place this insuperable barrier between the others and 
ourselves” (1987 [1937], p.76). Here Breton specifically conjoins the 
notions of interdiction with lethality through the image of the datura, a 
literary motif for both deadly noxiousness and an inability to 
distinguish illusions from reality (both of these being implied also by 
Lacanian sublimation). Moreover, Breton refers to the “insuperable” 
boundaries, which would ordinarily keep the individual from 
embarking upon an arbitrary sexual adventure, but which in Breton’s 
case seem only to have increased the lethal pull of the erotic.   
 
The historical context in which the events occur is not insignificant in 
exposing the potentially noxious consequences of such desire. 
Breton’s restless pursuit of love (both romantic and physical) will have 
appeared as an affront to many sections of society. At this time in 
France’s history – the interwar years – church and state had still 
programmed society in such a way as to prejudice its members 
against second marriages. When the surrealist film L’Âge d’Or – a 
cinematographic call to arms against the instruments of sexual 
repression – was screened in 1939, it depicted an upper-middle class 
woman fetishistically sucking on the toe of a statue. The response 
elicited by the film was so fierce that riots broke out in the cinema, 
surrealist paintings were slashed in the cinema vestibule, the 
surrealists were denounced by the press and the film was banned 
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from any further commercial showings. Breton’s conception of 
jouissance is then like Lacan’s regulated by law which is both 
religious and social in its foundation; at times seeming an insuperable 
boundary to self-expression. 
 
This is also implied in what Breton then goes on to say about 
temptation. Speaking of the forbidden fruit, Breton claims that it does 
not exist and desire itself is contingent upon a sense of temptation: 
 
Only temptation is divine. To feel the need to vary the object of this 
temptation, to replace it by others – this bears witness that one is about 
to be found unworthy, that one has already doubtless proved unworthy of 
innocence [/ that one already deserves to fall from grace].9 
  
(Breton, 1987 [1937], p.92) 
  
The statement’s resemblances with Lacanian thought are striking. 
Breton is stating that temptation is absolutely integral to desire and, 
furthermore, that in order for this desire to be sustained and renewed 
the love object must be varied. The state of grace as Breton 
conceives it is to be consumed by the passion of love, “to find once 
more the lost grace of the first moment when one is in love” (Breton, 
1987 [1937], p.44). As is the case with all states of grace then, when 
it is lost, there emerges a corresponding need to recuperate it, 
implying in Breton’s case the kind of libidinal circularity which 
following Lacanian theory is so characteristic of human relationships.  
 
Bretonian grace is also situated amid the throws of terrestrial love 
rather than issuing from a non-existent God (Breton, 1987 [1937], 
p.44 and 84). As such, Breton is actually proposing something rather 
subversive: in reclaiming the rights of the fallen man – and above all 
in his quest for earthly love and valorisation of temptation – he is 
taking an almost Luciferean stance. His intention is to usurp the cult 
of organised religion with the cult of (free) love and he achieves this 
with a good measure of profanity. Rather provocatively he proclaims 
for instance that it is an enduring fantasy of his to make love with a 
nun in the deepest recesses of the church (1992 [1928-32], p.14). 
Most remarkably of all, however, is that in making these statements, 
in pushing the boundaries of moral palatability almost to the level of 
indecency, he is identifying not with the ideal but with the material and 
the earthly, which has so frequently been considered to be the sole 
province of Bataillean philosophy. 
 
                                                 
9 The expression “démérité de l’innocence”, which is contained within the 
French original, can also be translated as “deserving to fall from grace” – 
hence its inclusion by the author in square brackets. 
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Breton’s conception of desire as predicated upon interdiction is one 
which will remain with him, and indeed ripen, throughout the 
remainder of his life. In 1959, toward the end of his career and by way 
of an introduction to the International Surrealist Exhibition whose 
leitmotif was eroticism, Breton writes once again not only in support of 
transgressive desire but highlights philosophy’s indebtedness to 
George Bataille for his insights into the subject: 
 
[quoting Bataille] “The inner experience of eroticism demands from the 
person involved an equal sensitivity towards the anguish which provides 
the basis for interdiction and the desire which tends to violate it” 
 
This interdiction, which has existed since time immemorial and continues 
to hold sway in every latitude over so-called “savage” and so-called 
“civilised” races alike, is the true target at which eroticism aims its arrow. 
 
I have no doubt that it will become increasingly explicit to the extent that 
we succeed in disentangling it from the dense undergrowth of prejudices 
which cover it. However, it would be idle to hope to advance here in the 
full light of day. Anyone who flatters himself on having braved prejudice 
and interdiction simultaneously, without turning a hair, will find himself 
disqualified from dealing with eroticism, since his own consciousness 
has failed to realise eroticism’s fundamental need for transgression.10 
 
(Breton, 1972 [1959], p.378-89) 
 
Breton is insistent that to confront the true nature of erotic desire an 
openness is required toward its transgressive nature as well as the 
overcoming of one’s own prejudices (which stands perhaps in 
contrast to the young Breton’s rather more judgemental attitude 
towards non-heteronormative forms of sexual behaviour).11 
 
As these are the carefully elaborated views of a seasoned Breton, I 
believe this makes them all the more definitive and complete; and that 
they detract from  the commonly held view of Breton as an idealising 
romantic who disdains Bataillean thought for its defence of the erotic. 
For what also points to the maturation and increasing openness of 
Breton’s attitude is his approbatory tone toward George Bataille to 
whom he pays homage at the very start of the text for having 
advanced the boundaries of humanity’s knowledge of eroticism: “It is 
Georges Bataille, again who, in the course of an urgent and often 
moving investigation of the subject, has succeeded best in making us 
apprehend eroticism for what it is, that is to say an ‘immediate aspect 
                                                 
10 Breton’s italics. 
11 Examples of such attitudes are to be found in Investigating Sex where 
Breton famously inveighs against homosexuality (1992 [1928-32], p.5, p.27-
28 and p.132) and unquestioning libertinism (1992 [1928-32], p. 32).  
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of inner experience, opposing itself to animal sexuality’” (1972 [1959], 
p.377) and whom, as we can see in the quote above, he adduces in 
defence of transgression.  
 
On the relationship between interdiction and desire, it is clear from 
Bataille’s own writings that he does not differ greatly from Breton on 
the matter. The fifth chapter of Bataille’s Erotism, entitled 
“transgression”, is peppered with variants on the axiom that “[t]he 
taboo [or “that which is forbidden”], is there in order to be violated”12 
(1986 [1957], p.64). Bataille also situates his view of erotic 
transgression in opposition to Christian orthodoxy, situating “the 
forbidden” with sin and sensuality13 and stating that the Luciferian fall 
represents an impoverishment of the divine rather a vital segregation: 
 
the fact that there might have existed a devil meant that the divine 
separated into two parts which ignored and failed to recognise one 
another. The divine part became impoverished. Now I don’t believe that 
today one can represent a sense of the sacred if one does not at the 
same time take note of the totality of those aspects, which are the divine 
and the diabolical.14      
 
(Bataille, 1979 [1951], p.188)   
 
The thematics of his literary works, such as Story of the Eye, are also 
entirely blasphemous, pushing the boundaries of taste to new limits 
and covering such themes as scatology, humiliation, rape, torture, 
and necrophilia. Like Breton, Bataille also relishes the representation 
of sexual acts which are performed in churches (such as the sexual 
assault and asphyxiation of a priest in Story of the Eye). Both men 
                                                 
12 The original does not make reference to taboo, but to “l’interdit”, which 
means literally “that which is forbidden” and hence its enclosure in square 
brackets – “L’interdit est là pour être violé” (Bataille, 1979 [1957], p.72). 
Variations of the same principle are to be found elsewhere in the chapter. 
For example: “The transgression does not deny the taboo [the forbidden] but 
transcends it and complements it” (Bataille, 1986 [1957], p.63) / “religion is 
the moving force behind the breaking of taboos [transgression of what is 
forbidden]” (Bataille, 1986 [1957], p.69). 
13 “It is in such representations of crime and sensuality that I have sought to 
locate what I call sin” (my translation) / “C’est dans ces représentations de 
crime et de sensualité que j’ai cherché à situer ce que j’appelle le péché” 
(Bataille, 1979 [1944], p.341). 
14 My translation. Original text reads: “le fait qu’il y eut le diable voulait dire 
que le divin se séparait en deux parties qui devait s’ignorer et se 
méconnaître l’une l’autre. La partie divine pure s’appauvrit. Or je ne crois 
pas que l’on puisse se représenter aujourd’hui le sentiment du sacré si l’on 
n’aperçoit en même temps la totalité de ces aspects, divin et diabolique”  
(Bataille, 1979 [1951], p.188). 
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show how the desire to represent and possess das Ding through a 
range of different signifiers is exacerbated in face of Christian moral 
imperatives, which threaten to repress rather than liberate the human 
subject. Lacan’s theory of das Ding being regulated by the law 
(specifically moral law) seems therefore vindicated by both men.   
 
In opposition to religious law, Breton posits the perverse, expressing 
a preference for “everything in physical love which pertains to 
perversity” (1992 [1928-32], p.29). In Investigating Sex: Surrealist 
Research, he admits the practices of free love, sodomy, onanism, 
semi-exhibitionism, sadism and lesbianism, which far from being 
considered perverse by today’s standards were certainly 
anathematised as such by the Christian orthodoxy of the day. Of all 
these practices it is sodomy he favours the most for its “moral non-
conformity” (1992 [1928-32], p.151) – in other words because of the 
deviation it represents from sexual protocol in a Christian marriage. 
Here once again a hidden affinity emerges with Bataille as he too is 
opposed to all of the sexual conventions which accompany a 
Christian marriage (sex for the propagation of the human species, 
coital sex). As Geoffrey Roche explains: 
  
for Bataille it is the very sinfulness of sexual activity that makes it 
significant. Without the sin of breaking taboos, according to Bataille, sex 
is not “erotic”. Therefore, sex within marriage, where there are no 
traditional taboos against sex, is not erotic; marriage itself providing only 
a “narrow outlet for pent-up violence”. 
 
(Roche, 2006, p.167) 
 
Bataille, then, viewed marriage as the very negation of the erotic, 
being merely a repository for frustrated or unsublimated aggression.  
 
Further resistance to moral conformity is demonstrated by both men 
in their conceptualisations of women. For Breton, this is reflected by 
his rejection of chastity in women (translated in French as “pudeur”) 
on account of its associations with Christianity. His conception of the 
woman is at least based as much on la femme-sorcière (“the woman-
sorceress”) as la femme-enfant (“the woman-child”), his ideal of 
womanhood, therefore, derived not from the Virgin Mary but from the 
ghostly vampire women (or succubae) of his dreams (1992 [1928-32], 
p.59-60) and the paintings of Gustave Moreau15 (1972 [1961], p.363). 
Similarly, Bataille’s depictions of women frequently centre about their 
                                                 
15 One of Moreau’s most famous paintings which provided literary inspiration 
for Breton as well as Moreau’s contemporaries, such as Huysmans and 
Wilde, was Salomé, who despite her captivating beauty, infamously had 
John the Baptist’s head served on a plate. 
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sinful aspect, claiming prostitutes to be “fallen beings” (1986 [1957], 
p.135; 1993 [1949], p.140) and the sight of a woman’s breasts “the 
pure incarnation of sin” (1988 [1954], p.127). The conceptions of 
women advanced by both Breton and Bataille are also spectral and 
empty in nature being oneiric, mythological, artistic or literary but 
seldom based entirely within the real.  
 
Lacan comments that such depersonalising characterisations of the 
female love object are a frequent attribute of (courtly) love poetry, the 
woman being “emptied of all real substance”16  as she is elevated; 
then becoming “terrifying – an inhuman partner” (1992 [1959-60], 
p.150). All poets who can be aligned with this tradition (including the 
surrealists) are according to Lacan merely addressing the same lady 
“who is never characterised for any of her real, concrete virtues, for 
her wisdom, her prudence, or even her competence” (1992 [1959-60], 
p.150). For Lacan, this is, moreover, one of the defining features of 
artistic and literary sublimation, though paradoxically such sublimation 
also has the capacity to debase: “It is only when the person involved 
is transformed into a symbolic function that one is able to speak of 
her in the crudest terms” (1992 [1959-60], p.149).  
 
When applied to Breton’s writings, Lacanian theory shows us once 
again that it is at the sight of das Ding that we are able to find both 
sublimation (a desire to exalt) and, coextensive with it, desublimation 
(a desire to reduce and simplify; and a corresponding desire to 
transgress). Lacan’s study underlines that the term “sublimation” is in 
itself problematic and perhaps even ambiguous if it contains the seed 
of desublimation within it. However, as has been stated in a recent 
study on the importance of sublimation within art: “sublimation is 
Janus-faced poised between the raw singularity of the drive and the 
polite decorum of the art gallery” (Thurston, 2003, p.30). Such a view 
of sublimation clearly diverges from Freud’s rather sanitising view of 
the phenomenon (in which both aim and object are made to serve 
non-sexual ends) – and is perhaps all the more disconcerting for it. In 
addition to the unexpected antinomy which sublimation opens out 
upon, we are faced with the moral contentiousness which surrounds 
the very representation of das Ding – its capacity  to challenge the 
boundaries of convention – whether in art and literature or via the 
                                                 
16 Such sublimation has met with feminist criticism even within Surrealism 
itself. In an article entitled “Introduction à une érotique révolutionnaire”, René 
Passeron wrote that: “it is not in sublimating a being that one liberates them. 
Sublimation has always its inverse, oppression... It is not by celebrating 
Mélusine that we shall advance a step towards the reign of desire, but by 
subjecting to materialist method the myths by which woman is lulled the 
better to be exploited” (1948, p.39). 
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signifying chain of individuals encountered in life who take on function 
of our “absolute Other”. According to Lacan, such representations 
only come into relief when in collision with the boundaries established 
religious, social and moral precepts. Homologous to this principle, we 
find two factions of the same movement, whose meaning and 
purpose were established by Breton and Bataille in opposition to the 
social mores of their day. It is for this reason that, following the logic 
of the Lacanian Ding, it seems otiose to consider sublimation or 
desublimation the sole province of either writer. 
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